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Introduction
Wage differences constitute a central explanation for the increasing dominant business practice of international outsourcing across a wide range of industries.
1 In high-wage countries with high unemployment rates due to labour market imperfections there are deep concerns about the adverse consequences of increasing outsourcing activities.
Outsourcing, so the argument goes, threatens jobs in the home country because foreign jobs may replace domestic jobs. Indeed, there is a direct crowding out when domestic and foreign jobs are substitutes. 2 But this may not be the whole story.
When outsourcing and domestic labour are substitutes, the domestic labour demand is decreasing and the wage elasticity of domestic labour demand is increasing in the share of outsourcing (see e.g. Senses (2006) for empirical evidence). This limits the mark-up trade unions can set above the opportunity cost of labour. Our paper shows that this indirect positive wage moderation effect will be stronger than the direct substitution effect as long as outsourcing costs are not yet too low. Then, domestic employment in outsourcing unionized firms increases when economic integration leads to a further fall in outsourcing costs because the ease of outsourcing disciplines the firms' unions.
Both substitution and wage moderation effects affect the efficacy of the government's employment policy measures that aims at correcting the labour market failure.
In the second part we analyze the consequences for domestic labour market policies, which, when direct controls are ruled out, are mainly restricted to changes of the labour tax system, by altering labour taxes and workers' tax exemptions, or the social security system, in particular the generosity of the unemployment insurance scheme. For 1 See e.g. Sinn (2007) for an overview or Stefanova (2006) concerning the East-West dichotomy of outsourcing. Amiti and Wei (2005) as well as Rishi and Saxena (2004) emphasize the big difference in labour costs as the main explanation for the strong increase in outsourcing of both manufacturing and services to countries with low labour costs. 2 Outsourcing may be beneficial for domestic jobs when foreign jobs are complements to domestic jobs.
See Skaksen and Sörensen (2001) for a theoretical treatment and e.g. Leahy and Montagna (2000) for empirical evidence.
these policies we will analyze to which extent outsourcing limits the efficacy of labour tax reforms with respect to domestic employment in unionized firms that engage in outsourcing. This policy-relevant issue will be discussed for two different outsourcing scenarios. Firms may write long-term contracts that fix the amount of outsourcing before the trade union sets the wage -which we will call the case of strategic outsourcing -or alternatively, firms may be flexible enough to decide upon the amount of outsourcing activity simultaneously with domestic labour demand after the domestic wage is set by
the trade union. We analyze how three isolated labour tax policy changes and one labour tax reform that all have proven as employment enhancing in the absence of outsourcing.
3
It turns out that, when domestic labour and outsourcing are perfect substitutes, both the negative effects of a wage tax and generous unemployment benefit payments on domestic labour demand and the positive effect of a tax exemption for workers on labour demand prevail. However, for any given labour demand elasticity the magnitude of changes critically hinges on the share of outsourcing activities. If outsourcing occurs but still plays a minor role for the firm, the effect of domestic labour tax policies on domestic employment in unionized firms becomes stronger than in the absence of outsourcing.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure of theoretical framework and lays out the time sequences of various decisions on labour demand and wage setting. In section 3 strategic outsourcing is presented and the effects of labour tax instruments and tax reforms are analyzed in section 4. Section 5 then analyzes the case of flexible outsourcing. The analytical results are illustrated by some numerical simulations in section 6. Finally, we present conclusions in section 7.
Basic framework
We first consider the case where the firm writes a long-term contract that fixes the amount of outsourcing before the trade union sets the wage. At stage 1, the government behaves as a Stackelberg leader and fixes the two labour tax parameters. To raise revenues, the government can employ a wage tax t, which is levied on the gross wage w, minus a tax exemption a . The tax base per worker for the wage tax t thus equals ) ( a w − . In the presence of a positive tax exemption a , the marginal tax rate t exceeds the average tax rate ) / 1 ( w a t − so that the tax system is linearly progressive. 4 The net-oftax wage the worker receives is given by ta w t w
At stage 2, the firm decides about how much of the workforce to outsource. The firm produces an output good with labour only, whereby, for analytical convenience, domestic labour L and foreign labour, i.e. outsourcing, M, are assumed to be perfect substitutes. To derive an explicit solution, we postulate the following decreasing returnsto-scale production function in terms:
(1)
The price of the output good is normalized to unity. Profit is given by
is a convex cost of establishing capacity M for foreign outsourced production.
At stage 3, the monopolistic firm-level trade union sets the gross wage. 5 It takes both the tax parameters and the outsourcing decision of the firm as given and anticipates the consequences that the wage setting will have for the domestic labour demand of its firm in stage 4. The time sequence of these decisions is summarized in Figure 1 . The decisions at each stage are analyzed by using backward induction. The analysis of the case where domestic labour demand and outsourcing are decided simultaneously is delegated to section 6. 
Using the production function (1) this leads to
A more extensive outsourcing activity will cet. par. decrease domestic labour demand.
This feature is fully consistent with empirical evidence. 6 Apart from the direct substitution effect dM dL − = , there is an additional indirect effect on domestic employment because outsourcing also affects the wage elasticity of labour demand
indicates the share of the workforce that is outsourced. In the absence of outsourcing this elasticity is constant,
. Domestic labour demand becomes the more elastic the larger the share of outsourcing is, i.e. we have
Furthermore, in the presence of outsourcing, domestic labour demand becomes sensitive to changes in the domestic labour cost, i.e the gross wage w:
the elasticity reacts positively to the wage set by the trade union, i.e. we have (using
6 See e.g. Görg and Hanley (2005) and Hijzen et al. (2005) . 7 Senses (2006) recently provided empirical evidence according to which higher outsourcing increases the wage elasticity of labour demand. See also Hasan et al. (2007) and Slaughter (2001) .
3 rd stage: wage setting
Wages are determined by a firm-level monopoly trade union, which maximizes the sum of its N members' income that consists of the net-of-tax wage income of employed member and some unemployment benefit payments b for those being unemployed. From the viewpoint of a small firm-level trade union b is exogenous. Denoting the objective function of the trade union by V, the maximization problem of the trade union is
from which it is straightforward to calculate the optimal wage
The comparative statics -taking into account that (5) 
, we obtain the first-order condition
, it becomes profitable for the firm to increase the outsourcing above the level where the marginal outsourcing cost cM equals the domestic gross wage w .
Higher outsourcing reaps an additional benefit for the firm in forcing its trade union to lower domestic wages. Figure 2 illustrates the reasoning. 
Increased international integration
In the following, we are interested in how domestic labour market policies are affected when the possibilities to outsource part of the workforce increase due to increased economic integration that lowers the outsourcing cost parameter c . A lower c indicates a higher degree of international integration. It has a positive effect on outsourcing,
, which in turn moderates domestic wages because
: a trade union in a firm that can engage in outsourcing will moderate wages to alleviate the consequences of increased economic integration. By contrast, the effect on domestic labour is not as clear-cut as might be expected:
When c falls, we have the direct effect of substituting foreign labour for domestic labour. This effect is counteracted by the indirect wage moderating effect. As it turns out, the indirect effect may be stronger as long as the share of outsourcing is small in the sense
, we have a strong effect of outsourcing on wage moderation, which in turn has a large effect on domestic labour because of the initially high employment level. As the share of outsourcing increases, the wage moderating effect decreases, i.e. 0 > MM w as well as the impact of wage moderation on domestic 
Effects of labour tax policy
With the results from the two previous sections, we can start analyzing the impact which labour tax policy has on domestic employment in firms that can outsource a part of its labor activity. Tax policy instruments affect domestic labour costs and the wage formation directly. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that tax policy instruments affect the domestic workforce indirectly via the strategic outsourcing options of the outsourcing firm in stage 3 and therefore the total employment via the induced wage rate change and the direct replacement of domestic workers by foreign workers.
For the strategic outsourcing decisions of the firm, it is straightforward to calculate the following qualitative results (see Appendix 1). First, we have
. In the case of tax exemption, we have 0
. A higher wage tax increases outsourcing while a higher tax exemption for workers lowers outsourcing activities. A more general unemployment benefit system, by contrast, makes the domestic trade union more demanding thus increasing outsourcing
. All these effects work via their effect on domestic gross wages. If the domestic gross wage rises (decreases), then outsourcing activities cet. par. rise (decrease). Increases in the domestic wage tax or the unemployment benefit payments increase outsourcing because the domestic wage rises, while increases in the wage tax exemption decreases outsourcing because it decreases the domestic wage.
How single tax instruments can work on wage formation and employment
With these partial derivatives we can now derive the total effects the tax policy instruments have on the wage setting by monopolistic trade unions. The total effect consists of the direct wage effect and on the indirect effect via the impact these instruments have on the strategic outsourcing decision of firms and thereby also on the wage rate. For a change in the wage tax rate we obtain,
where 1 < A (see Appendix 1 for details). In the presence of outsourcing the total effect of a wage rate change on the wage setting becomes smaller as we have
. A wage increase due to an increase in the wage tax makes outsourcing more attractive. This in turn reduces the impact the tax rate has on wage setting and lowers the benefits of a wage increase for the trade union. Analogously, the effect of changes in the tax exemption and unemployment benefit payments are moderated by the same factor
Now we can determine the total effects of the wage tax and tax exemption both via the wage effect and via the outsourcing effect on domestic employment. Using (7), we
From the first equation we can unambiguously sign the employment effect of a wage tax increase. Employment falls when the wage tax rises. The second equation decomposes the effect into the employment effect for a given amount of outsourcing activity M and the effect of a change in the strategic outsourcing. Using equation (8)), we obtain
as a condition for the direct effect of outsourcing. As long as the share of outsourcing in the workforce is relatively small, 5 .
, the induced outsourcing leads cet.
par. to an increase of domestic labour because, as explained above, the indirect effect via the change in the wage elasticity is stronger as long as the share of outsourcing is small.
If the degree of outsourcing relative to domestic labour demand is high enough then the impact of a tax reform will become stronger for any given η. This is always the case when more than 50 percent of the workforce is working abroad. An analogous argument can be made for the case when the tax exemption or the unemployment benefits changes.
Using equation (7) we have
Employment increases when the tax exemption rises (unemployment benefits fall). In addition, domestic employment is substituted for outsourced labour. The second equation
isolates the strategic outsourcing component and it becomes obvious that the magnitude of α (see condition (11)) also determines whether 
Increasing the degree of tax progression
It is often argued that increasing tax progression is good for employment. In this section, we reanalyze this question in the presence of outsourcing by looking at a tax reform that increases the degree of tax progression while keeping the average tax burden per worker constant, i.e. this means that we assume have, by using equations (7) and (8) (13) 0 ) 1 ( A higher degree of tax progression, keeping the relative tax burden per worker constant, will decrease the wage rate both in the presence and in the absence of outsourcing, but the wage rate change is smaller in the case of outsourcing because 1 0 < < A .
Finally, we characterize the employment effects of this tax reform. If we raise tax progression according to (13), we have, using equations (9) and (10), The wage moderating effect increases domestic labor demand, given the level of outsourcing. This effect is represented by the first term. Wage moderation, in addition, also makes it attractive to lower the outsourcing activities and replace outsourced labor by domestic labor. Hence both effects work into the same direction so that tax progression remains good for employment when firms have the opportunity to outsource their workforces. Hence, raising tax progression according to (16) is good for employment.
PROPOSITION 4:
In the presence of strategic outsourcing, increasing the degree of tax progression increases domestic employment.
Flexible outsourcing
So far we have focused on the case where the firm writes long-term contracts that fix the amount of outsourcing before the trade union sets the wage. Alternatively, the firm may be flexible enough to decide upon the amount of outsourcing activity only after the wage is set by the trade union. 9 The time sequence for this case is described by Figure 3 . (2), i.e. we have
. Since outsourcing is decided after the wage is set, outsourcing has no effect on the wage setting anymore. The profit maximizing outsourcing is thus given by (17) w cM = , instead of condition (6) that applies for the case of strategic outsourcing. As a consequence, for any given ratio M/L, the wage elasticity becomes larger in this case, i.e. As before, we start looking at the impact an increase in international integration ( 0 < dc ) has on domestic employment. As is shown in Appendix 4, we obtain a function The analysis of changes in the wage tax, the tax exemption and unemployment benefit payments consequently yields similar qualitative results in the case of flexible outsourcing. The derivatives simplify as we do not have to take into account the feedback effect of wage setting on the strategic outsourcing decision, i.e. we have 
A numerical illustration
The analytics has shown that, initially, an increase in economic integration followed by an increased outsourcing share has a positive effect on domestic employment because the possibility to outsource moderates wages and this wage moderation effect outweighs the negative impact of outsourcing on domestic employment. The analytics, however, does not allow us to say much about the difference between the two scenarios of strategic and flexible outsourcing. We therefore conducted a numerical simulation of the two equation systems ( (7) 
Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the outsourcing decisions of unionized firms for two different scenarios. In the first scenario the firm writes long-term contracts that fix the amount of outsourcing before the trade union sets the wage. In the second scenario, the firm is flexible enough to decide upon the amount of outsourcing activity simultaneously with domestic labour demand decision only after the wage is set by the trade union. We have shown that in both cases outsourcing leads to wage moderation, which is stronger in the case of flexible outsourcing because the outsourcing decision makes the domestic labour demand even more elastic. With long-term contracts the firm will outsource in order to force trade unions to moderate wages to compensate for domestic labour payment.
It turns out that as long as the share of the outsourced workforce is not too large, the induced wage-moderation effect on domestic employment outweighs the direct substitution effect: domestic employment increases in unionized firms within a wide interval of outsourcing costs when outsourcing costs fall so that international economic integration increases. Within our framework we could identify an upper boundary for the outsourcing share. As long as the outsourcing share does not exceed
, where δ indicates the total labour demand elasticity, domestic labour increases with outsourcing in unionized firms.
With respect to the impact of labour tax reforms on such firms, the qualitative effects of changes in the wage tax rate, the tax exemption and the unemployment benefit payments are the same as in the absence of outsourcing. Furthermore, increasing the degree of tax progression by keeping the relative tax burden per worker constant continues to be good for employment. Except for very small outsourcing activities, however, the impact of these policy measures on outsourcing unionized firms' domestic employment are diminished when outsourcing costs fall.
The first-order condition for optimal strategic outsourcing can be expressed, by using (2)). The second-order condition is
The differentiation of M π with respect to domestic wage tax t , tax exemption a and unemployment benefit b gives the following results:
In a similar way we have
Concerning the precise effects of parameters we have in terms of wage tax 
Furthermore, we have 0
To determine the impact of increased economic integration on domestic employment, we substitute (8) in (7) and differentiating this with respect to wage tax gives
The sign is determined by the sign of the numerator. Here we have:
, and also for 0
, we obtain
so that at least for a very small share of outsourcing, tax policy will affect labor demand more when economic integration
Appendix 2: effect of higher tax progression on wage formation under strategic outsourcing Substituting the RHS of (13) 
